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Abstract
This paper studies optimal communication flows in organizations. A production
process can be coordinated ex-ante, by letting agents stick to a pre-specified plan of ac-
tion. Alternatively, agents may adapt to task-specific shocks, in which case tasks must
be coordinated ex-post, using communication. When attention is scarce, an optimal
organization coordinates only a few tasks ex-post. Those tasks are higher performing,
more adaptive to the environment, and influential. Hence, scarce attention requires
setting priorities, not just local optimization. Our results provide micro-foundations
for a central idea in the management literature that firms should focus on a limited set
of core competencies.
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Roland Benabou, Arthur Campbell, Luis Garicano, Navin Kartik, Jin Li, Tim Van Zandt as well as numerous
seminar and conference participants. Andrea Galeotti is grateful to the European Research Council for
support through ERC-starting grant (award no. 283454) and to The Leverhulme Trust for support through
the Philip Leverhulme Prize.
Organizations exist to coordinate specialized agents, but have a limited communication
capacity or ‘attention’ to do so.1 Coordination, however, does not necessarily require agents
to communicate with each other. According to March and Simon (1958), there are two
general ways in which organizations can be coordinated:
“The type of coordination used in the organization is a function of the extent to
which the situation is standardized. (...) We may label coordination based on pre-
established schedules coordination by plan, and coordination that involves trans-
mission of new information coordination by feedback. The more stable and pre-
dictable the situation, the greater the reliance on coordination by plan (p182).”
Importantly, the type of coordination used is an organizational choice. As pointed out
by March and Simon: “(I)t is possible to reduce the volume of communication required from
day-to-day by substituting coordination by plan for coordination by feedback.” (p.183)
This paper studies the optimal coordination of production when attention is scarce. We
posit a simple model of team production in which a number of complementary tasks, such
as engineering, purchasing, manufacturing, marketing and selling, must be implemented
in a coordinated fashion and where agents privately observe task-specific shocks. While
coordination by plan saves on communication costs, it prevents agents from responding to
such shocks. Our insight is that scarcity of organizational attention makes it optimal to center
all communication around a small number of focal tasks. Agents in charge of those tasks
are disproportionally responsive to local information and influence the behavior of others.
Agents in charge of non-focal tasks stick closely to pre-established action plans in order
to avoid coordination failures. Thus, when attention is scarce, it is optimal to coordinate
ex-ante one group of tasks (by plan) and coordinate ex-post another set of tasks (through
communication). In this way, all tasks are well coordinated, but tasks are heterogenous
in their adaptiveness and influence. When attention is abundant, this asymmetry in task
coordination disappears. It is thus scarce attention that creates organizational focus.
1As emphasized by Herbert Simon, attention may well be the ultimate scarce resource in the economy.
According to Simon “a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that
attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources” (Simon 1971, p. 40–41). Similarly,
Arrow (1974, p.37) notes that ‘the scarcity of information-handling ability is an essential feature for the
understanding of both individual and organizational behavior.’
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Our results provide micro-foundations for a central idea in the management literature
that firms should focus on a limited set of “core competencies” (Prahalad and Hamel 1990)
and firms that aim to be “all things to all people,” will be “caught in the middle” and
fail (Porter 1980;1996). In our model, when attention is scarce, optimal organizations set
priorities – they select a number of tasks to focus attention on – even when all tasks are
ex ante identical. Organizations which fail to prioritize tasks underperform. Our insights
further link bureaucracy and rigid rules to limited organizational attention and the strategic
choices of a firm. In the face of conflicting needs for attention, the designer must decide
which tasks can be flexible and adaptive and which tasks are coordinated using bureaucratic
rules.2 This creates a stark asymmetry in the performance of various organizational tasks.
We conceptualize the available attention as the time agents spend in meetings to coordi-
nate production. If attention is abundant, all tasks share attention equally. Equal sharing
is intuitive, as we posit that there are decreasing marginal returns to attention: the proba-
bility with which communication (and coordination) is successful is concave in the attention
devoted to a task. Our central result, however, is that if attention is scarce and coordination
important, it is optimal to treat tasks asymmetrically and focus all attention on a few tasks.
The mechanism underlying the above result is a complementarity between attention and
decision-making, which creates a convexity in the value of attention. Agents take initiative
by adapting their task to local information. The more attention an agent receives, the more
initiative this agent can take as those initiatives are now better coordinated. In turn, the
more initiative an agent takes, the more important it is to devote scarce attention to him in
order to avoid coordination failures. By the same token, agents who are ignored by others
are forced to largely ignore their own private information. Since this makes their behavior
predictable, devoting attention to such agents is indeed a waste of time. Because of the
above complementarities, agents either communicate intensively about a particular task, or
they ignore it. Decreasing marginal returns to attention, however, provide a counterveiling
force which dominates when focal tasks receive too much attention. In the latter case, it is
optimal to reduce organizational focus by increasing the number of focal tasks.
2See Powell (2015) for an incentive-based rationale for rigid rules. In his model, the organization designer
reduces the adaptiveness of decisions to new information in order to limit influence activities.
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We derive a number of comparative static results. The scarcer is attention, the smaller is
the number of focal tasks. Improvements in communication technology which relax attention
constraints thus result in less focused organizations, with more agents being influential and
taking initiative. This is consistent with new trends in organizational design towards more
network-like organizations where communication flows are horizontal rather than vertical,
and decision-making and influence is broadly shared in the organization.3 More broadly,
such trends can often be usefully interpreted as “a move away from ex ante coordination
methods” towards more ex post coordination (i.e. using bilateral communication, rather
than bureaucratic rules). Online Appendix H discusses three case studies of organizational
change through the lens of our model. The number of focal tasks is also decreasing in
task-interdependence and the size of the organization. Larger organizations are thus more
bureaucratic and have a more centralized communication network. When tasks are ex-ante
symmetric, our theory does not select the tasks that the organization focuses on: there are
multiple optimal organizations. When tasks are heterogenous in terms of their importance,
however, the optimal organization is unique and the attention devoted to a given task often
depends more on the rank-order of a task’s importance than its absolute level. A small
decrease in task importance may then result in a task becoming non-focal and the agent
losing all his influence.
Section 3, finally, describes how our model can be extended to endogenize organizational
size, with larger organizations exploiting economies of scope but facing more daunting co-
ordination problems. As we show, organizations in more volatile environments or where
adaptation to local shocks is more important are then smaller but less focused. Perhaps
counter-intuitively, the impact of communication technology on size is ambiguous.
Literature. Our paper is part of a larger literature on team theory (Marschak and Radner
1972, Radner 1993), which studies games where agents share the same objective, but have
asymmetric information. As Garicano and Van Zandt (2013) emphasize, team theory is a
natural framework in which to analyze the questions raised in this paper, as these models
study interrelated decision-making when information is dispersed and there are limits to
3See Roberts and Saloner (2013) and references therein.
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communication, a canonical organizational problem.4 Despite the need for coordination in
all of those models, as far as we are aware, no paper has identified the corner solutions
which are at the center of this paper. Proposition 1 highlights why this is the case: It
is when communication flows are endogenously designed to support decision-making, that
non-concavities arise in team theory models.
Our paper further belongs to a recent literature in organizational economics, most promi-
nently Dessein and Santos (2006) (DS hereafter), Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008),
Rantakari (2008) and Bolton, Brunnermeir and Veldkamp (2013), that emphasizes coordina-
tion adaptation trade-offs as a key mechanism determining organizational form.5 All these
papers study how organizations are designed to coordinate production and assume a similar
quadratic pay-off structure as our paper. Closest to us is DS, which studies task specializa-
tion in organizations, but restricts communication flows to be symmetric; instead the present
paper takes task specialization as given and endogenizes communication patterns. Calvo,
de Marti and Prat (2014) also endogenizes communication patterns in a framework similar
to that of DS. Their focus, however, is on how asymmetries in pay-off externalities result in
asymmetric communication flows and differential influence for agents.6
Finally, a literature on ‘narrow business strategies’ and ‘vision’ (Rotemberg and Saloner
1994, 2000) has argued that the commitment by a principal or leader to select a certain
type of projects provides strong incentives for agents to exert effort related to such projects.
Similarly, Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) shows how a lack of focus impairs incentives
in a multi-task carreer concerns model. In contrast to the present paper, organizational focus
is thus a tool to improve incentives.
1 The model
We posit a team-theoretic model, based on Dessein and Santos (2006) and Alonso et al.
(2008), to study decision-making and communication within an organization.
4See, e.g., Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) and Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007).
5See also Van den Steen (2013), which studies the role of an explicitly formulated ‘strategy’ (a small set
of key decisions) in coordinating production.
6In contrast to our paper, asymmetric communication patterns do not arise in a symmetric set-up.
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Production and Payoffs. Production involves the implementation of n tasks, each per-
formed by one agent i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Organizational trade-offs arise because agents
need to adapt tasks to privately observed task-specific shocks while maintaining coordination
across different tasks. Specifically, agent i observes a piece of information θi and must take
a primary action, qii ∈ R, and a coordinating action, qij ∈ R, for each task j ∈ N \{i}. The
local information of agent i, θi, is a shock with variance σ
2
θ and mean θˆi, and its realization
is independent across agents. Given a particular realization θ = [θ1, θ2, ..., θn], and a choice
of actions, q = [q1, q2, ..., qn], with qi = [qi1, qi2..., qii, ..., qin], the organization’s profits are:
pi (q|θ) = nP −
∑
i∈N
Li (q|θ) , (1)
where P are the gross profits per task and Li (q|θ) are the expected losses related to task i
due to maladaptation and miscoordination:
Li (q|θ) = φi(qii − θi)2 + β
∑
j∈N\{i}
(qji − qii)2. (2)
The profits of the organization depend, therefore, on (i) how well adapted agent i′s primary
action qii is to task i
′s local information θi and (ii) how well coordinated agent j′s coordinating
action qji is to agent i
′s primary action qii. The parameter φi is the importance of adapting
task i to its task-specific shock and β is the weight given to miscoordination. Hence β can
be interpreted as measuring task-interdependence. We assume that φi < (n − 1)β, for all
i ∈ N , so that coordination losses are non-trivial.
Communication frictions. Our starting point is that organizations design communication
flows to coordinate production, but organizational attention is scarce. Formally, we define an
attention allocation as t = [t1, t2, ..., tn], where ti ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈N ti ≤ τ , with τ <∞. We can
think of ti as the “air-time” or “attention” any agent i receives, and τ as the length of time an
agent spend in meetings as opposed to production.7 We assume that with probability r(ti)
agent j learns agent i’s primary action,8 and, with the remaining probability, communication
7Alternatively, we can interpret ti as the total number of signals that agents receive about qii, where each
signal correctly reveals qii with probability 1− e−λ.
8In our framework it is is immaterial whether the probability of successful communication is correlated or
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is uninformative, and that r(ti) follows a poisson process with hazard rate λ:
r(ti) = 1− e−λti . (3)
Importantly for what follows, the communication technology (3) exhibits decreasing marginal
returns, r′′(ti) < 0. Moreover, we have that limti→∞ r(ti) = 1 and limti→∞ r
′(ti) = 0. In what
follows, we write the organizational attention constraint
∑
i∈N ti ≤ τ as
∑
i∈N
ln(1− r(ti)) ≥ ln(1− r(τ)). (4)
Section 1.1 discusses alternative specifications to the above communication technology.
Timing. In stage 0, an organization designer chooses the optimal attention allocation t.
In stage 1, agents observe their local information and take their primary action. In stage
2, agents observe each other’s primary actions according to the attention network t, and
then take their coordinating actions. Following a team-theoretical approach, at stage 0,
the designer also specifies the decision rules for both primary and coordinating actions that
maximize expected payoffs, and agents follow these rules in stage 1 and 2. Equivalently, we
can model the resulting agents’ primary and coordinating actions as the equilibrium outcome
of a Bayesian Game with common payoffs (see Garicano and Van Zandt 2013).
1.1 Interpretation and assumptions of the model
We comment on two key modelling choices– organizational objectives and communication
technology– and the robustness to alternative specifications.
Organizational objectives and trade-offs. Expression (1) captures the notion, going
back to at least March and Simon (1958), that it is adaptation to unpredictable contingen-
cies, combined with communication frictions, that create coordination problems in organi-
zations. If the organization had unlimited attention, agents can perfectly adapt to their
local information, because, by means of communication, they can coordinate ex-post. Com-
independent across agents j 6= i. The reason is that agent i chooses his primary action without knowledge
of whether communication will be informative or not, which simplifies the analysis (see ‘Timing’ below).
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munication frictions, however, make ex-post coordination less effective. Another option is
for agents to ignore their private information and always implement their task in the same
manner – stick to a pre-agreed course of action. No communication is then needed to achieve
coordination. Agents coordinate ex-ante, but this comes at the cost of maladaptation.
We have assumed that each agent takes a primary action and a series of complementary
actions. In Online Appendix E we study an alternative specification in which each agent
chooses a single action, qii = qij = qi, in line with Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008).
We show that qualitatively identical results obtain. Moreover, for our analysis, it does not
matter if agent i maximizes, as we have postulated, firm perfomance (common pay-offs) or
a mix of firm performance and task performance, as in Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari
(2008). Finally, the model allows for different task-specific mal-adaptation costs, φi 6= φj,
but we have kept mis-coordination costs, β, homogeneous across tasks. Online Appendix F
extends the model to have different degrees of interdependence βi 6= βj.
Communication technology. In our model, there is an aggregate constraint on the infor-
mation sent by agents. Moreover, we posit that all agents j 6= i devote the same amount
of attention to task i, consistent with communication occuring in public meetings. Informa-
tion flows in organizations are of course more complex. Online Appendix C considers some
alternative models of communication such as bilateral communication, where agents commu-
nicate one-to-one (and, hence, agent 3 may devote more attention to agent 1 than agent 2
does) and individual attention constraints where each agent has a fixed capacity τ that can
be used for both sending and receiving information (and, hence, the time agents 3 and 4
communicate does not affect the attention constraints of agents 1 and 2). They all result in
attention allocations that are equivalent to the ones that are optimal under public communi-
cation with an aggregate constraint. Far from being exhaustive, our framework thus captures
some modal forms of communication inside organizations.9 Furthermore, Online Appendix
G shows that our findings are robust to an endogenous communication capacity τ . While we
posit a specific binary communication technology, Online Appendix D shows that identical
results obtain if communication is noisy instead and, following the literature on Rational
9Interesting avenues for future research include mixed forms of communication, where members attend
public meetings but also meet on a bilateral basis to refine messages and verify instructions. We also do no
model the trade-off between time devoted to communication and production.
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Inattention (Sims 2003), entropy is used to model the cost of more precise communication.
2 Optimal Attention Networks
Without loss of generality, we focus on decision rules that are linear in the agent’s informa-
tion. Consider first stage 2, where agents observe each other’s primary actions according to
the attention network t, and then take their coordinating actions. With probability r(ti),
communication about task i has been successful and agent j optimally sets qji = qii; other-
wise the optimal coordinating action is given by qji = E[qii]. In stage 1, agent i’s primary
action can be written as qii = θˆi + αi(θi − θˆi) and, at the optimum, minimizes task i’s ex-
pected losses E[Li(q|θ)]. Note that αi = Cov(qii, θi)/σ2θ and, therefore, is a measure of agent
i’s adaptiveness to his local information. Similarly, a natural measure of agent i’s influence
on agent j is Cov(qji, θi)/σ
2
θ = r(ti)αi. Substituting decision rules into (2), we obtain
E[Li(q|θ)] =φi(1− αi)2σ2θ + β(n− 1)(1− r(ti))α2iσ2θ (5)
2.1 Exogenous Attention Networks
As a benchmark, we derive optimal decision-making under the assumption that communi-
cation flows are exogenously given (as in Dessein and Santos, 2006). Minimizing (5) with
respect to αi, we obtain that the optimal degree of adaptiveness equals
α∗i (ti) =
φi
φi + β(n− 1)(1− r(ti))
. (6)
From (6), the adaptiveness and influence of agent i is decreasing in the need for coordination
β and the number of tasks n, but is increasing in the importance of task i (i.e. φi) and the
attention devoted to task i. We obtain the following benchmark result:
Proposition 1 Assume communication flows t are exogenously given. Agent i’s adaptive-
ness and influence is continuous and decreasing in the cost of mis-coordination, β, and
continuous and increasing in the importance of his task φi. If tasks are ex ante symmetric–
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i.e., φi = φ and ti = t for all i ∈ N ,– then each agent is equally adaptive and influential–
i.e., α∗i = α
∗
j for all i, j ∈ N .
Proposition 1 shows that, when communication flows are determined independently from
decision-making, the need for coordination by itself does not create any discontinuities or
non-concavities in organization design. As we show in the next section, organizations operate
very differently when communication flows are designed optimally.
2.2 Endogenous Attention Networks
It is useful to think of a designer choosing both decision rules–i.e., (α1, ..., αn)– and commu-
nication qualities–i.e, {r1, .., rn}, with ri = 1− e−λti– rather than an allocation of attention
t. The organization design problem is then equivalent to
max
α1,..,αn,r1,...,rn
E[pi(q|θ)] = nP −
∑
i∈N
[
φi(1− αi)2σ2θ + β(n− 1)(1− ri)α2iσ2θ
]
, (7)
subject to constraint (4). Inspecting (7), it is immediate that agent i’s adaptiveness , αi,
and task i’s communication quality, ri, are complementary choices, i.e.,
∂2E[pi(q|θ)]
∂ri∂αi
= β(n− 1)σ2θ > 0. (8)
The more adaptive is an agent’s task, the more important it is to communicate effectively
regarding this task in order to ensure coordination. Similarly, the better is the communica-
tion quality ri, the higher is the optimal level of adaptiveness αi. As we illustrate now, this
fundamental complementarity between the attention devoted to an agent and his adaptive-
ness, implies that, when the organizational attention is scarce, attention is concentrated on
a few tasks. This, in turn, dictates large ex-post asymmetries across agents in terms of their
influence and adaptiveness.
Ex-ante symmetric tasks. Consider first the most striking case where all tasks are ex-
ante symmetric– i.e, φi = φ for all i ∈ N . From (8), if there were constant marginal returns
to attention, that is r′(ti) = c, then whenever task l is more adaptive than task j 6= l, profits
can always be increased by reallocating attention away from task j towards task l. This, in
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turn, makes it optimal to further increase the adaptiveness of task l and further reduce the
adaptiveness of task j. Similarly, when task j and l are equally adaptive and receive equal
attention, profits can always be improved by increasing both αl and tl and reducing both αj
and tj. It follows that whenever r(τ) < 1, task l receives all the attention and task j none.
In our model, however, there are decreasing marginal returns to attention, as captured
by r′′(ti) < 0, and it would require an infinite amount of attention to set ri = 1. Decreasing
marginal returns provide a counterveiling force for organizational focus. Indeed, when tl > tj
and αl > αj it may be optimal to re-allocate attention on the margin to task j since
r′(tj) > r′(tl). As we show in the Appendix, in an optimal organization, it must then be that
k ∈ {1, ..., n} focal tasks split the organizational attention evenly and obtain communication
quality r(τ/k) = 1− e−λτ/k, whereas the remaining n− k tasks receive no attention.
Proposition 2 Assume all tasks are ex ante symmetric– i.e., φi = φ for all i ∈ N . Then in
an optimal organization, k∗ ∈ {1, ..., n} tasks split the organizational attention evenly with
ti = τ/k and the remaining tasks receive no attention.
Given Proposition 2, the adaptiveness of focal and non-focal tasks are respectively α∗(τ/k)
and α∗(0), where α∗(ti) is given by expression (6). Substituting α∗(τ/k) and α∗(0) in (7) and
rearranging terms, expected profits in an organization with k focal tasks can be written as
Π(k) ≡ nP − k [1− α∗(τ/k)]φσ2θ − (n− k) [1− α∗(0)]φσ2θ (9)
and the optimal number of focal tasks, k∗, is given by k∗ = argmaxk∈{1,2,··· ,n}Π(k). We say
that an organization is ‘focused’ whenever k∗ < n, and some tasks receive no attention. An
organization is ‘balanced’ when k∗ = n and all tasks split attention evenly.
When is a focused organization optimal? From (9), the pay-offs associated with task i
are linear in its (optimal) level of adaptiveness α∗(ti). Hence, a focused organization with
k < n focal tasks will be preferred over a balanced organization if and only if,
k [α∗(τ/k)− α∗(τ/n)] > (n− k)[α∗(τ/n)− α∗(0)] (10)
Thus, the benefit of moving from a balanced to a focused organization with k focal tasks is
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the increase α∗(τ/k) − α∗(τ/n) in the adaptiveness of k focal tasks; the cost is the decline
α∗(τ/n)− α∗(0) in the adaptiveness of the (n− k) non-focal tasks. It is easy to verify that
the function α∗(ti) is S-shaped. Because of the complementarity between the attention ti
devoted to a task and the adaptiveness αi of the same task, α
∗(ti) is convex and increasing
in ti whenever λti is small. But because of the decreasing marginal returns to attention,
α∗(ti) becomes concave in ti whenever λti is large. Indeed, we have that
∂2α∗(ti)
∂t2i
> 0⇔ 2β(n− 1)
φ+ β(n− 1)(1− r(ti)) > −
r′′(ti)
r′(ti)2
⇔ (n− 1)βe−λti > φ (11)
It follows that a focused organization with k∗ < n is optimal when effective attention, λτ, is
scarce. More generally, fixing k < n, a sufficient condition for k∗ ≤ k is that α∗(ti) is convex
in ti at ti = τ/k. We summarize this discussion as follows:
Proposition 3 Assume all tasks are ex ante symmetric. Fix k < n, if (n − 1)βe−λτ/k > φ
then the optimal number of focal tasks k∗ ≤ k. It follows that the optimal organization is
focused (k∗ < n) when λτ is sufficiently small, n is sufficiently large or the ratio β/φ is
sufficiently large.
Our assumption that r(ti) represents a Poisson learning process allows us to derive clean
conditions for organizational focus. More generally, from (11), as long as −r′′(ti)/r′(ti)2 < 2
for ti small, organizational focus will be optimal whenever attention is scarce and coordina-
tion important. This condition on the curvature of r(ti) captures the notion that decreasing
marginal returns to attention must be mild when ti is small.
10 In the Appendix, we derive
the following comparative static results:
Proposition 4 Assume all tasks are ex ante symmetric. The optimal number of focal tasks
k∗ is increasing in effective communication capacity λτ and the importance of adaptation φ,
and is decreasing in tasks interdependence β, and the size/complexity of the organization n.
There are some immediate implications from Proposition 4. Over the last decades, there
have been enormous technological innovations in communication and coordination tech-
nologies (E-mail, wireless communication and computing, intra networks, electronic data
10For r(ti) = 1− e−λti , we have that −r′′(ti)/r′(ti)2 = 1/e−λti . Note that −r′′(ti)/r′(ti)2 grows without
bound for ti large, reflecting strongly decreasing marginal returns for ti large.
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interchange (EDI)) which can be interpreted as an exogenous increase in the effective at-
tention capacity λτ . An implication of Proposition 4, therefore, is that such technological
improvements result in a shift towards more balanced organizations that pay attention to
the task-specific information of a larger number of agents. This is consistent with new
trends in organizational design towards more network-like organizations where communica-
tion flows are horizontal rather than vertical, and where decision-making and influence is
broadly shared in the organization. These novel organizations have been documented in
both cases studies and large scale empirical studies (Whittington et al. 1999, Guadalupe,
Li and Wulf 2014).11 While our model abstracts away from important organizational issues
(hierarchy, for example, plays no role in our model), those new organizational structures can
be usefully interpreted as a shift away from ex ante coordination, through bureaucratic rules
and standard operating procedures, towards more ex post coordination, through bilateral
communication between agents directly involved in production, and this in response to im-
provements in communication technology. Online Appendix H discusses three case studies
of organizational change through the lens of our model. The first case discusses a novel
organizational structure at Proctor and Gamble, introduced in the early 2000’s and widely
imitated by other global consumer packaged goods companies. The second example studies
changes in the apparel industry towards ‘lean retailing’, which were caused by the interac-
tion of an increased need for adaptation to fashion trends and improvements in IT such as
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). The final example is concerned with an innovation in
management called Quality Function Deployment (QFD), which is geared towards solving
problems of coordination between different functions, such as marketing and engineering.
Our results further point to a trade-off between organizational size and organizational
focus. Smaller organizations distribute attention more evenly and, hence, the information
of more agents is reflected in decision-making. As an organization grows larger, leadership
becomes more concentrated as there is more need for coordination. Despite the organization
having more members, fewer of them receive attention. An increase in n thus has a similar
effect as an increase in β. This is consistent with the experience of many entrepreneurial firms,
11Guadalupe et al. document how, in recent decades, C-level executive teams in Fortune 500 firms have
almost doubled in size, mainly because of the inclusion of more functional managers.
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whose culture of joint-decision-making and open lateral communication often disappears as
they grow larger and more hierarchical.
Asymmetric tasks. When tasks are ex-ante symmetric, our theory does not select the
tasks that the organization focuses on: there are multiple optimal organizations. Our next
result considers the case where tasks are heterogenous in terms of their importance. Not
only is the optimal organization unique then, the attention devoted to a given task often
depends more on the rank-order of a task’s importance than its absolute level.
Proposition 5 Assume that φi > φi+1 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}. In the unique optimal
organization, attention is focused on the k∗ most important tasks and more important tasks
receive more attention–i.e., there exists k∗ so that for every i < j ≤ k∗, t∗i > t∗j > 0 and
t∗i = 0 for every i > k
∗.
A corollary of Proposition 5 is that a change in the importance of a task that alters its
relative ranking may result in a discrete drop or jump in the attention devoted to that task,
and, therefore, to the agent’s adaptiveness and influence.12 In other words, scarce attention
requires setting priorities – not just local optimization. In our benchmark with exogenous
communication flows (Proposition 1), an agent’s adaptiveness and influence was continuous
in the importance of its task. In contrast, when communication flows are optimally designed
to support decision-making, a small decrease in task importance may result in a task becom-
ing non-focal and the agent losing all his influence. Similarly, an increase in the importance
of an already focal task may make it optimal for the organization to focus on less tasks.
3 Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on the coordination of production when
communication flows are optimally designed. When attention is scarce, organizations opti-
mally set priorities and coordinate only a few tasks ex post, through communication. Those
tasks are higher performing, more adaptive to the environment, and influential. The re-
maining tasks are coordinated ex ante, and the agents in charge of them stick closely to
12For example, an increase in the importance of task i, with i > k∗, will eventually result in a discrete
jump from t∗i = 0 to t
∗
i > 0 and a discrete drop from t
∗
k∗ > 0 to t
∗
k∗ = 0.
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prespecified action plans – standard operating procedures. Beyond this insight, our model
can be used to shed light on new trends in organization design, as discussed following Propo-
sition 4 and in Online Appendix H.
To conclude, we informally discuss an extension where organizational size is endogenous.
In our basic model, the size or “scope” of the organization is fixed. In multi-product firms,
however, different tasks may correspond to different types of products or services, and it is
natural to think of the number of tasks as being endogenous. In Online Appendix B, we en-
dogenize the number of tasks by introducing economies of scale or scope: certain fixed costs
can be shared among tasks (e.g. production facilities or a distribution network), yielding
benefits to size. The size of organizations, however, is limited by the need for coordination
and limited organizational attention. Two empirically relevant drivers of organizational size
are the volatility of the environment and changes in information and communication tech-
nologies. Consistent with recent trends in “de-scoping”(Roberts and Saloner 2013), we show
that the optimal scope of organizations decreases as the environment becomes more volatile
and adaptation becomes more important. Intuitively, by reducing the number of tasks that
it undertakes, the organization reduces its coordination needs, hence allowing for better
adaptation. At the same time, the number of tasks that receive attention increases. Hence,
as the environment becomes more volatile, there is a move from large, focussed organizations
that maximize scope economies to smaller, but more adaptive and balanced organizations.
Improvements in information technology might be conjectured to always increase the size of
organizations, as they allow for better coordination. Interestingly, we show that informa-
tion technology has a decidedly ambiguous impact on firm scope. Intuitively, information
technology makes it optimal for organizations to shift towards a strategy that emphasizes
adaptation to its environment, but smaller and more balanced firms are better configured
to do so. Hence, while for low levels of information technology, large, non-adaptive firms
exploiting economies of scale are optimal, we show that for intermediate levels of information
technology, smaller, more flexible firms are often preferred.
14
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 2 follows from the fact that if t is optimal, then
ti = tj for all i and j such that ti > 0 and tj > 0. We now prove this statement. Using (7)
and (6) we write the objective of the organisation as
E [pi (q, t|θ)] = nP − nσ2θφ+
n∑
i=1
[
φσ2θ
φ+β(n−1)(1−r(ti)
]
.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that ti > tj > 0. Consider now two alternative organizations.
One organization, denoted by t′, is the same as t, but t′i = ti −  and t′j = tj + . The
second organization, denoted by tˆ, is the same as t, but tˆi = ti +  and tˆj = tj − . These
constructions are derived for some small and positive .
Since t is optimal, we must have that E [pi (q, t|θ)] > E [pi (q, t′|θ)]. This is is equivalent
to
[
e−λtj − e−λ(ti−)] [β2(n− 1)2e−λ(ti+tj) − φ] > 0, and, since ti > tj, for small  we have that
e−λtj − e−λ(ti−) > 0 and therefore optimality of t requires that β2(n− 1)2e−λ(ti+tj) − φ > 0.
Similarly, since t is optimal, we must have that E [pi (q, t|θ)] > E [pi (q, tˆ|θ)]. This is
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equivalent to − [e−λ(tj−) − e−λti] [β2(n− 1)2e−λ(ti+tj) − φ] > 0, and, since ti > tj, we have
that e−λ(tj−)−e−λti > 0, and therefore optimality of t requires that β2(n−1)2e−λ(ti+tj)−φ <
0. We have then reached a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Inspection of expression (9) implies that
k∗ = arg max
k∈{1,...,n}
Γ(k) ≡ k[α(τ/k)− α(0)],
where α(t) is given by expression (6). Simple analysis of the function Γ(k) for k ∈ [0,∞]
reveals that Γ(k) is first increasing and then decreasing. Furthermore, the sign of Γ′′(k) is
the same as the sign of α′′(τ/k). By condition (11) we know that α(τ/k) is concave (resp.
convex) at τ/k if (n−1)βe−λτ/k < φ (resp. (n−1)βe−λτ/k > φ). This implies that there exists
a k¯ < ∞ such that Γ(k) is concave for all k ≤ k¯ and convex for all k > k¯. Furthermore,
since Γ(k) is first increasing and then decreasing, it follows that k¯ is strictly higher than
k′ = arg maxk∈[0,∞) Γ(k). Hence, if we verify that k ∈ {1, ..., n} is such that α(τ/k) is convex
at τ/k, then it must be the case that the optimal organization is focused on k∗ ≤ k tasks.
Proof of Proposition 4. We state Lemma A, which is then used to prove Proposition 4.
The proof of Lemma A follows by investigating the behaviour of the profit function of an
organization with k focal tasks, e.g., the function (9); the proof of Lemma A is relegated in
online Appendix A.
Lemma A. There exist 0 < β¯(n) < ... < β¯(k + 1) < β¯(k) < ... < β¯(2) such that the
optimal organization has: k∗ = n focal tasks if β/φ < β¯(n), k∗ ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} focal tasks if
β/φ ∈ (β¯(k∗ + 1), β¯(k∗)), and k∗ = 1 if β/φ > β¯(2). Furthermore
β¯(k + 1) =
1
n− 1
[
e
λτ
k+1 + ke−
λτ
k(k+1) − (k + 1)
k + e−
λτ
k − (1 + k)e− λτk(k+1)
]
. (12)
Lemma A implies that the optimal number of focal tasks k∗ is decreasing in β and
increasing in φ. Next, to see that k∗ is increasing in λτ , we notice that β¯(k+ 1) is increasing
in λτ because the numerator is increasing in λτ and the denominator is decreasing in λτ .
Finally, that if k∗(n) < n then k∗(n+ 1) ≤ k∗(n) follows from the fact that the cut-off β¯(k)
is decreasing in n.This completes the proof of Proposition 4. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We order tasks as follows φi > φi+1. The problem of the designer
specified in (7) subject to the constraint (4) can be rewritten as follow: maxr1,...,rn G(r1, .., rn) ≡∑
i φiα
∗
i (ri), subject to
∑
i ln(1 − ri) = ln(1 − r(τ)) and ri ≥ 0 for all i. Recall also that
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α∗i = φi/[φi + β(n− 1)(1− ri)]. The Lagrangian is then
L =
∑
i
φiαi(ri)− λ[ln(1−R)−
∑
i
ln(1− ri)],
and, at the optimum, for each task i so that ri > 0 it must hold
φi
∂αi(ri)
∂ri
− λ
1− ri = 0 iff α
2
i (ri)[1− ri]β(n− 1) = λ.
And so, if ri > 0 and rj > 0, then [1− ri]α2i (ri) = [1− rj]α2j(rj). We now use this necessary
condition to show that at the optimum if ri > 0 then ri > rj for all j > i. For a contradiction
suppose that rj ≥ ri > 0, with j > i.
First, consider that rj = ri > 0. From the necessary condition above we know that
(1 − ri)α2i (ri) = (1 − rj)α2j(rj), but this is impossible because ri = rj and αi(r) > αj(r)
for all r. Second, consider that rj > ri. Optimality implies that G(r1, .., ri, .., rj, .., rn) ≥
G(r1, .., rj, .., ri, .., rn) if, and only if, φiαi(ri)+φjαj(rj) > φiαi(rj)+φjαj(ri), or, equivalently,
φi[αi(rj)−αi(rj)] < φj[αj(rj)−αj(ri)]. Note that φi[αi(rj)−αi(ri)] = αi(ri)αi(rj)β(n−1)[rj−
ri] and therefore the above inequality is equivalent to αi(ri)αi(rj) < αj(ri)αj(rj), which is
a contradiction because αi(r) > αj(r) for every r. Hence, in the optimal organization there
exists a k∗ ≤ n so that ri > 0 for all i ≤ k∗ and ri = 0 otherwise, and that ri > rj for every
i < j ≤ k∗. 
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4 On-line Appendix: Not For Publication
Appendix A contains the proof of Lemma A, which is used to prove Proposition 4 in the
paper. Appendix B endogenizes the size of the organization. Appendix C extends the
analysis to different models of communication. Appendix D discusses our communication
technology and relates it to the literature on Rational Inattention. Appendix E shows that
our insights are robust to an alternative model of production that has been widely used in
the literature on organizational economics. Appendix F takes the case of tasks that have
different coordination costs. Appendix G endogenizes attention capacity. The extensions
presented in Appendix E-F-G are developed, for simplicity, for the case of an organization
with two agents. Appendix H discusses three examples of organizational change through the
lens of our model.
4.1 Appendix A: Proof of Lemma A.
Lemma A. There exist 0 < β¯(n) < ... < β¯(k + 1) < β¯(k) < ... < β¯(2) such that the
optimal organization has: k∗ = n focal tasks if β/φ < β¯(n), k∗ ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} focal tasks if
β/φ ∈ (β¯(k∗ + 1), β¯(k∗)), and k∗ = 1 if β/φ > β¯(2). Furthermore
β¯(k + 1) =
1
n− 1
[
e
λτ
k+1 + ke−
λτ
k(k+1) − (k + 1)
k + e−
λτ
k − (1 + k)e− λτk(k+1)
]
. (13)
Proof of Lemma A. Recall that expected payoffs of an organization with k focal tasks is
E(pi (q, t|θ)) = nP − nσ2θφ+ σ2θ
[
kφ
φ+ β(n− 1)(1− r(τ/k)) +
(n− k)φ
φ+ β(n− 1)
]
.
Denote by γ = β/φ. Then, we write
E(pi (q, t|θ)) = nP − nσ2θφ+ σ2θ
[
k
1 + γ(n− 1)(1− r(τ/k)) +
(n− k)
1 + γ(n− 1)
]
.
We obtain that
dE [pi (q, t|θ)]
dk
=
λγ
(1 + γ(n− 1))k
(
1 + γ(n− 1)e−λτk
)2 Φ(k, γ, τ , n),
where
Φ(k, γ, τ , n) = k
[
1− e−λτk
] [
1 + γ(n− 1)e−λτk
]
− λτ(γ(n− 1) + 1)e−λτk ,
1
and that
d2E [pi (q, t|θ)]
dkdk
= − λ
2γ(n− 1)τ 2e−λτk
k3
(
1 + γ(n− 1)e−λτk
)3 [1− γ(n− 1)e−λτk ] .
Observation 1. By direct verification, the function Φ(k, γ, τ , n) is decreasing in γ for all
k, τ , n. Note also that the sign of dE[pi(q,t|θ)]
dk
is the same as the sign of Φ(k, γ, τ , n).
Denote by β˜ the solution to 1 − β˜(n − 1)e−λτn = 0. Also, denote by βˆ the solution to
1 − βˆ(n − 1)e−λτ = 0. Since 1 − β(n − 1)e−λτk is decreasing in β and decreasing in k, the
following observation follows:
Observation 2. (2a) β˜ < βˆ for all τ , n; (2b) If γ < β˜ then d
2E[pi(q,t|θ)]
dkdk
< 0 for all k; (2c) If
γ > βˆ then d
2E[pi(q,t|θ)]
dkdk
> 0 for all k.
We now show that there exists a β(τ , n) > 0 such that for all γ < β(τ , n) the number of
focal tasks is k = n. Denote by β(τ , n) the solution to Φ(n, β(τ , n), x, n) = 0. Explicitly,
β(τ , n) =
n
(
1− e−λτn
)
− λτe−λτn
λτ − n
(
1− e−λτn
) β˜.
Observation 3. Direct verification implies (3a) β(τ , n) < β˜ for all τ , n; (3b) β(τ , n) is
increasing in τ .
Observation 3a together with observation 2b imply that dE[pi(q,t|θ)]
dk
is declining in k for all
γ < β(τ , n). So, for all γ < β(τ , n), the lower value of dE[pi(q,t|θ)]
dk
is obtained when k = n,
and, at k = n we have
dE [pi (q, t|θ)]
dk
|k=n = γ
(1 + γ(n− 1))n
(
1 + γ(n− 1)e−λτn
)2 Φ(n, γ, τ , n) > 0,
because, by observation 1, Φ(n, γ, τ , n) > Φ(n, β(τ , n), τ , n), and, by definition, Φ(n, β(τ , n), τ , n) =
0. Hence, for all γ < β(τ , n) the expected returns of an organisation with k focal tasks are
increasing in k, which implies that the optimal organization has k∗ = n.
We now show that there exists a β¯(τ , n) > β(τ , n) such that for all γ > β¯(τ , n) in the
optimal organization the number of focal tasks is k∗ = 1. Denote by β¯(τ , n) the solution to
Φ(1, β¯(τ , n), τ , n) = 0. Explicitly
β¯(τ , n) =
1− e−λτ − λτe−λτ
λτ − 1 + e−λτ βˆ.
2
Observation 4. Direct verification shows that: 4a. β˜ < β¯(τ , n) < βˆ, for all τ and n; 4b.
β¯(τ , n) is increasing in τ .
Observation 1 together with Φ(1, β¯(τ , n), τ , n) = 0 imply that Φ(1, γ, τ , n) < 0 for all γ >
β¯(τ , n). Similarly, observation 1 together with Φ(n, β(τ , n), τ , n) = 0 and observation 4a,
imply that Φ(n, γ, τ , n) < 0 for all γ > β¯(τ , n). So, dE[pi(q,t|θ)]
dk
is negative at k = 1 and at
k = n. Observation 4a and observation 2b implies that dE[pi(q,t|θ)]
dk
is either first decreasing
in k and then increasing in k (when γ ∈ [β¯(τ , n), βˆ]) or it is always increasing in k (when
γ > βˆ]). Hence, the profits of the organization are decreasing in k for all γ > β¯(τ) and
therefore the optimal organization has k∗ = 1.
We now conclude by considering the case where γ ∈ (β(τ , n), β¯(τ , n)). From the analysis
above we infer that the marginal expected profits to k of the organization around k = 1
are positive, because Φ(1, γ, τ , n) > 0, and that the marginal expected profits of the orga-
nization around k = n are negative, because Φ(n, γ, τ , n) < 0. Furthermore, observation
2b implies that, for all γ ∈ (β(τ , n), β¯(τ , n)), the marginal expected profits of the organi-
zation, dE[pi(q,t|θ)]
dk
, are either always decreasing in k (when γ ∈ [β(τ , n), β˜]) or they are first
decreasing in k and then increasing in k (when γ ∈ [β˜, β¯(τ , n)]). Hence, there exists a unique
k∗ ∈ [1, n] such that dE[pi(q,t|θ)]
dk
|k=k∗ = 0; such value of k∗ is the solution to Φ(k∗, γ, x, n) = 0
and, k∗ maximizes the expected profit of the organization. Finally, by applying the implicit
function theorem, dk∗/dγ < 0 if and only if dΦ(k∗, γ, τ , n)/dk < 0. Note that this last in-
equality holds because the fact that there exists a unique k∗ in which Φ(k∗, γ, τ , n) = 0 and
the fact that Φ(1, γ, τ , n) > 0 and Φ(n, γ, τ , n) < 0, assure that for all γ ∈ (β(τ , n), β¯(τ , n))
the function Φ(k, γ, τ , n) is decreasing around k∗.
We have therefore shown that for every k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} there exists a β(k+ 1) < β(k) such
that: a. if γ = β(k + 1) the optimal organization has k∗ = k + 1; b. if γ ∈ (β(k + 1), β(k))
the optimal organization has either k∗ = k or k∗ = k + 1, and c. if γ = β(k) the optimal
organization has k∗ = k.
We now show that for every k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} there exists a unique value of γ ∈ (β(k +
1), β(k)), say β¯(k), such that at γ = β¯(k) the expected profit of the organization with k
focal tasks is the same as the expected profit of the organization with k + 1 focal tasks. For
brevity define G(x) = e−
λτ
x and denote by ∆(k, γ) the difference between the expected profit
generated by k+ 1 focal tasks and the expected profit generated by the organization with k
focal tasks. We obtain
∆(k, γ) = σ2θ
[
k + 1
1 + γ(n− 1)G(k + 1) −
k
1 + γ(n− 1)G(k) −
1
1 + γ(n− 1)
]
.
3
Taking the minimum common denominator, we have that ∆(k, γ) = 0 if, and only if,
(1 + γ(n− 1)) [(k + 1)(1 + γ(n− 1)G(k))− k(1 + γ(n− 1)G(k + 1))]−
−[1 + γ(n− 1)G(k)][1 + γ(n− 1)G(k + 1)] = 0.
This is a quadratic equation in γ and therefore there are only two solutions of γ. Moreover,
it is immediate to check that γ = 0 is one of the solution. Hence, there is only one non-zero
solution. Simple algebra shows that the non-zero solution is given by expression 13. This
completes the proof of Lemma A. 
4.2 Appendix B: Endogenous Organizational Size
We endogenize organizational size n∗. A possible interpretation of our model is that each
task corresponds to a different type of product or service that is produced by a multi-product
firm. By engaging in multiple tasks, firms can spread out some fixed costs F > 0 and realize
scope economies (Panzar and Willig, 1981). Doing so, however, increases coordination costs
as now more tasks need to be coordinated. We maintain the assumption of our base line
model that each agent i has an attention capacity τ to participate in public meetings.13
Let φi = φ for all i ∈ N and let k∗(n) is the optimal number of focused tasks given size
n (Proposition 2). We assume that pay-offs of an organization of size n are given by
Π˜(n) = Π(k∗(n))− F
where organizational size is chosen to maximize profits per product-line, i.e.,
n∗ = arg max
n
1
n
E[Π˜(n)]
Our underlying assumption is that firms, whenever profitable, have the option to operate a
set of product lines independently as a separate organization. Note that splitting up a single
firm, with n∗ = m agents participating in one meeting, into two independent firms, each
with n∗ = m/2 agents participating in two different meetings, does not create additional
communication capacity. Total agent time spent in meetings remains mτ .
Management scholars have cited many reasons for the rise of new organizational forms,
but there are two prominent lines of explanation. The first is the “increased turbulence”
that managers face because of rapid technological changes, deregulation, and globalization
13Further, agent i needs to be present in a public meeting with agent j both to learn about agent j′s
primary action and for agent j to learn about agent i′s primary action.
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(Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2005; Roberts and Saloner, 2013). In our model this corresponds to
an increase in the volatility of the environment σ2θ.
Proposition 6 Assume φi = φ for all i ∈ N . The optimal organization size n∗ is decreasing
in σ2θ. Furthermore, k
∗(n∗)/n∗ is increasing in σ2θ. If k
∗(n∗) < n∗, the number of focal tasks
is increasing in σ2θ.
As σ2θ increases, so do the incentives to adapt, which in turn bring coordination costs. By
narrowing firm scope (reducing n∗), and increasing the number of focused tasks, organizations
partially reduce these coordination costs, allowing for a better adaptation. Proposition
6 therefore reflects the common idea that smaller organizations are more “nimble” and
“flexible.” 14 Note while organizational scope n∗ depends on the variance σ2θ, the decision on
how many tasks to focus given n, that is k∗(n), is independent of σ2θ if n is fixed. Intuitively, an
increase in the variance does not change the trade-off between adaptation and coordination,
but it does affects the benefits of resolving this trade-off (for example by reducing size). Thus,
for a given level of adaptiveness to local shocks αi, an increase in the variance increases
both expected adaptation losses (as primary actions are then, on average, further away
from the realized shock) and expected coordination losses (as primary actions are then,
on average, further away from the uninformed coordinating actions). The optimal level
of adaptiveness, however, is not affected and neither is the optimal level of organizational
focus. But since coordination and adaptation losses are larger with a larger σ2θ, it pays for
the organization to invest more in communication technology (as in online Appendix G) or
to reduce organizational size and incur higher fixed costs (as in this Appendix). Note, finally,
that while k∗(n) does not depend on the variance σ2θ of schocks, k
∗(n) is decreasing in the
importance of adaptation to those shocks, φ.
The other prominent line of explanation is improvements in information and communi-
cation technology. In our model this corresponds to an increase in λτ. One may conjecture
that an increase in the effective communication capacity always results in (weakly) larger
organizations. The next proposition states that this is not necessarily the case
Proposition 7 Organizational size n∗ may be decreasing in communication capacity λτ
when λτ is small.
Intuitively, what restricts organizational size, is the adaptiveness of the organization, not
communication capacity. When the communication capacity (λτ) is very limited, organiza-
tions often give up on adapting to local shocks, and choose n∗ large in order to minimize
14Rantakari (2013b) obtains a related result in a different setting. He shows how firms operating in more
volatile environments decentralize decision-making and reduce task-interdependence, whereas in our model,
firms become more balanced and reduce firm scope.
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Figure 1: Endogenous organizational size and focus as a function of τ
Optimal organizational size, n∗ (continuous line), and focal tasks, k∗ (dashed line), as a function of τ . In
this example the maximum number of tasks is n = 18, σ2θ = 1, β = .25 and F = 3.
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average fixed costs/maximize economies of scope. As λτ becomes larger, the organization
then uses the extra communication capacity to become more adaptive. Doing so without
incurring substantial coordination costs, however, requires reducing organizational size n∗,
often substantially. As a result of an increase in λτ the organization then moves from a
“large, rigid bureaucracy” into a “nimble, adaptive democracy”. For larger values of λτ, or-
ganizational size slowly increases again with τ . Figure 1 illustrates changes in organizational
size and on the number of focal tasks in response to changes in communication capacity τ .
For simplicity, it is assumed that n∗ is constrained to n∗ ≤ n = 18. For τ very small, the
organization size is set at the maximum, n∗ = n. As communication capacity τ increases,
the organization is transformed from a “large, rigid bureaucracy” with eighteen tasks but
only one focused task into a “nimble, adaptive democracy” with six tasks which share the
attention evenly. For larger values of τ , organizational size slowly increases again with τ and
attention remains evenly distributed.
Our model thus predicts that improvements in ICT may result in a shift from large inflex-
ible organizations emphasizing economies of scale and scope, towards smaller, more balanced
organizations, which are focused on being adaptive to external shocks and emphasize hori-
zontal communication linkages.15 This is consistent with recent trends in organization design,
15This prediction stands in contrast with those of obtained in recent team-theory models that model or-
ganizations as information-processing (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994) or problem-solving institutions (Gar-
6
as described by Whittington et al. (1999) and Roberts and Saloner (2013). According to
our model, only organizations that are already very adaptive, respond to ICT improvements
by increasing organizational scope. Alternatively, observed trends toward de-sizing and de-
scoping may have been a response to an increased variability in the environment (Proposition
6), for example because of globalization and increased competition (Rivkin and Siggelkow,
2005; Roberts and Saloner, 2013).
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove that the optimal organization size is decreasing in σ2θ.
Recall that k∗n+1 is the optimal number of focal tasks given n+ 1 tasks and k
∗
n is the optimal
number of focal tasks given n tasks. Then
E[Π˜(n)]
n
= P − σ2θ − F/n+
1
n
(
k∗n
1
1 + (n− 1)βe−λτ/k∗n + (n− k
∗
n)
1
1 + (n− 1)β
)
σ2θ (14)
whereas
E[Π˜(n+ 1)]
n+ 1
= P − σ2θ − F/(n+ 1) (15)
+
1
n+ 1
[
k∗n+1
1 + (n− 1)βˆe−λτ/k∗n+1 +
(n− k∗n+1)
1 + (n− 1)βˆ +
1
1 + (n− 1)βˆ
]
σ2θ,
where βˆ = n
(n−1)β > β.
Suppose first that k∗n+1 ≤ n. Then, Proposition 3 implies that k∗n ≥ k∗n+1. To prove the
proposition is then sufficient to show that
∆ ≡ E[Π˜(n+ 1)]
n+ 1
− E[Π˜(n)]
n
is decreasing in σ2θ. Since βˆ > βˆe
−λτ/k∗ , a sufficient condition for ∆ to be decreasing in σ2θ is
that
kn
1 + (n− 1)βe−λτ/k∗n +
n− k∗n
1 + (n− 1)β >
k∗n+1
1 + (n− 1)βˆe−λτ/k∗n+1 +
n− k∗n+1
1 + (n− 1)βˆ
Since k∗n ≥ k∗ and βˆ > β,this is indeed satisfied.
icano, 2000; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). While these papers also characterize optimal information
flows in organizations, improvements in communication technology unambiguously result in larger and more
centralized organizations.
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Next, assume that k∗n+1 = n+ 1; We then have hat k
∗
n = n. Hence
∆ =
[
1
1 + (n− 1)βˆe−λτ/(n+1) −
1
1 + (n− 1)βe−λτ/n
]
σ2θ + F/n− F/(n+ 1).
Since βˆ > β, it follows that ∆ is decreasing in σ2θ. The second part of the proposition follows
from this result and proposition 3. 
4.3 Appendix C: Alternative communication models
This Appendix extends the result of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 to alternative models
of communication. Without loss of generality we set, hereafter, φ = 1.
B.1. Bilateral communication with aggregate organizational constraints.
We now consider that communication is bilateral and that the constraint is at the orga-
nizational level. Formally, the allocation of attention is t = {tji}ji∈N , where tji denotes the
amount of communication between agent i and agent j about local information θi. Let τ be
the total communication capacity of the organization. Then, we require that t satisfies∑
i
∑
j
tij ≤ τ .
We maintain the assumption that r(tij) = 1−e−λtij . The following equivalent result obtains:
Result 1. In an optimal organization under bilateral communication and constraint τ ,
the allocation of attention t = {tji} satisfies
tji = t
P
i for all i, j ∈ N ,
where tP = {tP1 , ..., tPn } is the allocation of attention in an optimal organization under public
communication and constraint τP = τ/(n− 1).
Proof of Result 1. The key step for this equivalence result is the proof of the following
Lemma
Lemma 8 Consider bilateral communication and constraint τ . In an optimal organization
all agents devote the same attention to a particular agent, that is, for all i ∈ N , tji = tki for
all j, k ∈ N \ {i}.
Proof of Lemma 8. Suppose that t is optimal and, for a contradiction, assume that
there exists some agent i such that tji > tki ≥ 0. Define a new organization t′, which is the
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same as t with the exception that t′ji = tji −  and t′ki = tki + , for some small and positive
. Using the expression for expected payoffs, it is easy to verify that
E [pi (q, t|θ)]− E [pi (q, t′|θ)] ≥ 0,
if, and only if,
e−λt
′
ji + e−λt
′
ki ≥ e−λtji + e−λtki . (16)
Since t′ji = tji− and t′ki = tki+, after some algebra we obtain that condition 16 is equivalent
to
e−λtki ≤ e−λ(tji−) ⇐⇒ tki ≥ tji − ,
which, for  sufficiently small, contradicts our initial hypothesis that tji > tki. This completes
the proof of Lemma 8. 
Note that under bilateral communication and arbitrary capacity τ , Lemma 8 implies that
the optimal allocation of attention t satisfies tji = tli for all j, l 6= i. Hence, in the optimal
organization every agent j 6= i devotes the same attention to agent i, that is the restriction
imposed by public communication. It is immediate to see the relation between τ and τP .
B.2. Individual Communication Constraints
So far we have assumed that the communication constraint is determined at the organi-
zational level. Alternatively, each agent may have a limited communication capacity τ I .
Formally, let each agent have access to an individual communication channel, whose fi-
nite capacity τ I can be used to broadcast information to all other agents and/or to pro-
cess information broadcasted by others. Each agent i then optimally decides on a vector
ti = [ti1, ti2, ..., tii, ..., tin] , where ∑
j∈N
tij ≤ τ I ∀i ∈ N , (17)
and where tii is the capacity devoted to broadcast information about θi, and tij is the capacity
devoted to listen to the information broadcasted by agent j 6= i. We maintain the assumption
that 1−r(tij, tjj) = e−λmax{tij ,tii} We now proof the following equivalence result, which again
implies that the optimal organization is focused on k∗ tasks with k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and that
the same comparative statics hold as in Proposition 3.
Result 2. Under individual communication and individual capacity constraint τ I , in the
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optimal organization the allocation of attention t = {tij}i,j satisfies
tjj = tij = t
b
ij ∀i, j ∈ N
where tb = {tbij}i 6=j is the allocation of attention in the optimal organization under bilateral
communication and capacity constraint τ = (n− 1)τ I .
Proof of Result 2. Consider the case of individual communication with individual
capacity constraint τ I . Suppose that t is an optimal organization. It is immediate to see that
t satisfies: a. tji ≤ tii for all i, j ∈ N and b.
∑
j tji = τ
I for all ij ∈ N . Now note that if tb
is an optimal organization under bilateral communication and constraint τ = (n−1)τ I , then
organization t∗ with t∗ji = t
∗
ii = t
b
ji is a feasible organization under individual communication
and satisfies property a. and b. above. We now claim that t∗ is optimal under individual
communication and individual capacity constraint τ I . Suppose there is another organization
t that does strictly better than t∗. First, note that the expected profit of an organization,
for a given t, can be written in terms of residual variances as follows
E[pi(t|θ)] = −nσ2θ +
n∑
i=1
σ2θ
σ2θ + β(n− 1)
∑n
j=1 RV(tji, tii)
,
where RV(tji, tii) = σ
2
θ(1− r(tji, tii)). Second, t must satisfy property a and property b and
therefore min{tji, tii} = tji, and so the residual variance that agent j has about task i is
RV(tji). Since t is strictly better than t
∗ is follows that the profile of residual variances
{RV(tji)}ji is better than {RV(t∗ji)}ji. But then, construct tˆb as follows: tˆbji = tji. Note that
tˆb is feasible under bilateral communication and capacity τ . Furthermore since the profile
of residual variances {RV(tji)}ji is better than {RV(t∗ji)}ji, it must also be true that profile
of residual variances {RV(tˆbji)}ji is better than {RV(tbji)}ji, and so tˆb must be strictly better
than tb, which contradicts our initial hypothesis that tb is optimal. 
4.4 Appendix D: Information Theory.
While we posit a specific binary communication technology, this Appendix shows that iden-
tical results obtain if communication is noisy instead and, following the literature of Rational
Inattention, entropy is used to model the cost of more precise information.
In particular, we now consider that messages mji and local information θi are normally
distributed and the attention constraint
∑
i ti ≤ τ is modelled as a constraint on the total
reduction in entropy, as in Information Theory (Cover and Thomas 1991) and the literature
on Rational Inattention (Sims 2003). This specification leads to the same residual variance
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that is obtained in the binary communication technology adopted in the paper. Since, in an
equilibrium with linear strategies, the expected profits for a given attention allocation t can
be written as a function of the residual variance, identical results obtain with this alternative
communication technology. We now develop these arguments formally.
For simplicity, we focus on the two-task case. Let mi be a message about θi and let
m = (m1,m2). The mutual information between m and θ, denoted by I(θ;m), equals the
average amount by which the observation of m reduces uncertainty about the state θ, where
the ex ante uncertainty is measured by the (differential) entropy of θ,
H(θ) = −
∫
f(θ) log f(θ)dθ,
and the uncertainty after observing m is measured by the corresponding entropy
H(θ|m) = −
∫
f(θ|m) log f(θ|m)dθ.
Denoting by τ the (Shannon) capacity of the communication channel, the constraint on
information conveyed by m about θ is given by 16
I(θ;m) = H(θ)−H(θ|m) ≤ τ . (18)
Following Sims (2003) and the subsequent literature on rational inattention, we assume
that θ1 and θ2 are (independently) normally distributed, and communicated through a Gaus-
sian communication channel which contaminates its inputs with independent normally dis-
tributed noise, e.g., mi = θi + i, where i is normally distributed. As a result, also m1 and
m2 and the conditional distributions F (θ1|m1) and F (θ2|m2) are independently normally
distributed. As noted by Sims, Gaussian communication channels minimize the variance of
F (θi|mi) given the constraint (18) on the mutual information between θi and mi. Hence,
they maximize the correlation between mi with θi.
17 Given that θ1 and θ2 are independently
distributed, we have
I(θ;m) = I(θ1;m1) + I(θ2;m2), (19)
where I(θi;mi) = H(θi) −H(θi|mi). Moreover, since the entropy of a normal variable with
16The capacity of a channel is a measure of the maximum data rate that can be reliably transmitted over
the channel. Shannon capacity has proven to be an appropriate concept for studying information flows in a
variety of disciplines: probability theory, communication theory, computer science, mathematics, statistics,
as well as in both portfolio theory and macroeconomics.
17This follows from a well known result in information theory that among all distributions with the same
level of entropy, the normal distribution minimizes the variance.
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variance σ2 is given by 1
2
ln(2pieσ2), we obtain
I(θi,mi) =
1
2
(
lnσ2θ − ln Var(θi|mi)
)
. (20)
It follows that the constraint (18) on the mutual information between θ and m can be
rewritten as
lnσ2θ − ln Var(θ1|m1) + ln σ2θ − ln Var(θ2|m2) ≤ 2τ . (21)
We can now re-interpret the mutual information between mi and θi as the attention
devoted by the organization to task i. Denoting t1 ≡ I(θ1,m1) and t2 ≡ I(θ2,m2), the
constraint on mutual information (18) imposed by the Shannon capacity becomes equivalent
to our attention constraint t1 + t2 ≤ τ .
Using the above formalization, we obtain a tractable expression for RV(ti) ≡ V ar(θi|mi).
Indeed, from (20) and ti ≡ I(θi,mi), we have
lnRV (ti) = lnσ
2
θ − 2ti, i = 1, 2. (22)
or still
RV (ti) = σ
2
θe
−2ti , i = 1, 2, (23)
where t1 + t2 ≤ τ . To conclude, it is easy to show that, for a given t, the expected profits in
an equilibrium with linear strategies can be written as:
E[pi(t|θ)]− nσ2θ +
n∑
i=1
φσ2θ
φσ2θ + β(n− 1)RV(ti)
.
4.5 Appendix E: Technological trade-offs between adaptation and
coordination.
In this Appendix we show that our insights hold in a model of coordination a la Alonso,
Dessein, Matouschek (2008), Rantakari (2008) and Calvo et al. (2011). We consider the case
for two agents, but everything can be generalized to n agents. In these class of models, instead
of having the distinction between primary action and complementary action, each agent
chooses one single action. We posit that agent i chooses qi. Given a particular realization of
the string of local information, θ = [θ1, θ2], and a choice of actions, q = [q1, q2], the realized
profit of the organization is:
pi (q|θ) = K − φ(q1 − θ1)2 − φ(q2 − θ2)2 − β(q1 − q2)2, (24)
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where β is some positive constant. Without loss of generality we normalize φ = 1. The
communication technology follows the description in our basic model.
Standard computation allows us to derive agents’ best replies, for a given network t =
(t, τ − t). We obtain:
q1 =
1 + β
1 + 2β + β2e−λt1
θ1 +
β
1 + 2β + β2e−λt2
E[θ2|I1] (25)
q2 =
1 + β
1 + 2β + β2e−λt2
θ2 +
β
1 + 2β + β2e−λt1
E[θ1|I2] (26)
where E[θ2|I1] is θ2 if communication is successful, otherwise it equals θˆ2.
Substituting (25) and (26) into (24) and taking unconditional expectations we find that
the problem
max
t
Epi(q|θ) s .t .t1 + t2 = τ
is equivalent to
max
t∈[0,τ ]
1
1 + 2β + β2e−λt
+
1
1 + 2β + β2e−λ(τ−t)
where t = t1 and t2 = τ − t.
It is easy to verify that
∂Epi(q|θ)
∂t
> 0 ⇐⇒ (1 + 2β)2 − β4e−λτ > 0.
We then obtain a result that is qualitatively the same as the one stated in Proposition 2
and Proposition 3. For every τ there exists a β(τ) > 0, so that for all β < β(τ) the optimal
organization has t = τ/2, whereas for every β > β(τ) the optimal organization has t = {0, τ}.
Furthermore, β(τ) is increasing in τ .
4.6 Appendix F: Asymmetric Coordination Costs.
In this appendix we consider tasks that are asymmetric in terms of their potential coordina-
tion costs. That is, some tasks impose larger coordination costs (delays, low product quality)
should other tasks not take the appropriate coordinating actions. For example, in designing
a car, important changes made to how the engine works, may have important consequences
for the remainder of the design. Should attention be focused on those highly interdependent
tasks? We show that this is not necessarily the case. For conciseness of the argument, we
consider the two-task case and set φ = 1.
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Let the coordination parameters be β1 and β2 for task 1 and 2, respectively. We assume
that coordination problems are not trivial, i.e., β1 > β2 ≥ 1. Define β =
√
β1β2, the
geometric mean of β1 and β2 and consider situations where
β1 = β (1 + ) and β2 = β (1 + )
−1 .
The parameter  thus determines the “spread” between the coordination costs across tasks:
An increase in  > 0 increases the coordination costs associated with task 1 and decreases
that of task 2, leaving the geometric average, a sufficient statistic for how costly lack of
coordination is to the organization, unchanged. When  = 0 the case collapses to the one of
ex-ante symmetric tasks.
Proposition 9 There exists > (β) > 0 :
1. If λτ < > (β), the optimal organization is focused on task 2, i.e., (t∗1, t∗2) = (0, τ).
If λτ ≥ > (β), let ̂ be the solution to (1 + ̂)2 e−2τ = 1 :
(a) If  < ̂ then τ > t∗1 > t
∗
2 > 0.
(b) If  ≥ ̂, then (t∗1, t∗2) = (τ , 0) .
If attention is limited, λτ < > (β), then all attention is focused on the task which is least
interdependent: Task 2. The reason is that allocating limited attention to task 1 is essentially
not worth it as it would translate into limited adaptation given the large coordination costs
the organization would bear. Instead, it is better to provide all attention to task 2 and let
task 2 be adaptive. Task 1 is then coordinated by restricting its adaptiveness.
Instead when the attention capacity is larger and the asymmetry  is not too large,
both tasks receive attention but task 1 receives more than task 2. Intuitively, if both tasks
are allowed to be adaptive, more attention needs to be devoted to that task that is more
interdependent. If asymmetries between both tasks are sufficiently large, task 2 may even
receive no attention for λτ > > (β) . At the threshold λτˆ = > (β) , the organization then
switches from being fully focussed on task 2 to being fully focussed on task 1.
Proof of Proposition 9.
We can express expected profit for a given t as
E[pi(q|θ] = −(1− α11)2σ2θ − (1− α22)2σ2θ − β1(1− r1)α211σ2θ − β2(1− r2)α222σ2θ, (27)
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where αii = 1/(1+βi(1−r(ti))). Hence, the organizational problem is to choose t1 = t ∈ [0, τ ]
to maximize expression (27). We obtain that the profits of the organization are decreasing
in t, if, and only if,
−[1− β1β2e−λτ ][β1e−λt − β2e−λ(τ−t)] > 0. (28)
It is convenient to divide the analysis in two cases. Recall that we are assuming that β > 1+
(which is equivalent of assuming β2 > βˆ = 1).
Case 1. Assume that β1e
−λτ − β2 > 0, or  > ̂. This assumption implies that β1e−λt −
β2e
−λ(τ−t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, τ ]. This in turn implies that the objective function is decreasing
in t if, and only if,
1− β1β2e−λτ < 0⇐⇒ λτ < ln β
which is always satisfied because β > 1 + . So, if λτ < ln β and  > ̂, it is optimal to set
t = 0 and there is focus on task 2.
Case 2. Assume now that β1e
−λτ − β2 < 0, or  < ̂. Since β1 − β2e−λτ > 0 and since
β1e
−λt−β2e−λ(τ−t) declines in t, it follows that there exists a t∗ so that β1e−λt∗−β2e−λ(τ−t∗) =
0. Indeed, such t∗ solves β1/β2 = e
−λ(τ−t∗)/e−λt
∗
and since β1 > β2 and e
−λt is decreasing in
t, it follows that t∗ > λτ/2. The next two observations complete the proof:
First, if 1 − β1β2e−λτ > 0, then the objective function is increasing in t for t ≤ t∗ and
it is decreasing in t for all t > t∗. Hence, in the optimal organization t = t∗. Second, if
1− β1β2e−λτ < 0, then the objective function is decreasing in t for all t ≤ t∗ and increasing
in t for all t ≥ t∗. Hence, there are two candidates for the minimum: either t = 0 or
t = τ . Comparing the two organizations it reveals that since 1− β1β2e−λτ < 0 the optimal
organization has t = 0, and so there is focus on task 2. Note also that 1 − β1β2e−λτ > 0
and β1e
−λτ − β2 < 0, are mutually compatible, if and only if, β > 1 + , which holds by
assumption. This concludes the proof of Proposition 9. 
4.7 Appendix G: Endogenous Attention Capacity
So far we have taken τ to be a hard constraint in the amount of time agents can devote
to communication with each other. In practice this is another margin that organizations
can use to improve performance, by, for example, allowing more time for meetings and
communication between teams. Equivalently, the organization can increase the effective
communication capacity τ , by cross-training and rotating employees, by hiring employee
with higher cognitive abilities, or by investing in communication technology. Assume thus
that an organization can acquire a capacity τ at a cost C (τ). C (τ) represents for example
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the costs of having team members engaged in communications activities rather than in
production. We assume that this cost has the following properties:
C (0) = C ′ (0) = 0 C ′ (τ) > 0 C ′′ (τ) ≥ 0 and C ′′′ (τ) ≥ 0.
The problem of organizational design is now
max
τ ,t
Epi (q|θ)− C (τ) subject to
∑
i
ti ≤ τ . (29)
The following proposition characterizes the optimal organization in the case of two ex-
ante identical agents. Without loss of generality we set φ = 1.
Proposition 10 The optimal communication capacity τ ∗ is increasing in σ2θ. Furthermore,
there exists σ¯2θ > σ
2
θ > 0 such that t
∗
1 ∈ {0, τ ∗} if σ2θ ≤ σ2θ and t∗1 = τ
∗
2
if σ2θ > σ¯
2
θ.
Proof of Proposition 10. We first show that the optimal capacity τ ∗ is increasing in
σ2θ in the focused organization and in the balanced organization. We consider the focused
organization first. Recall that the expected profits in the focused organization are
E [pic (q|θ)] = −βσ2θ
[
1
1 + β
+
e−λτ
1 + βe−λτ
]
− C(τ).
Taking the derivative with respect to τ we have
∂E [pic (q|θ)]
∂τ
=
λβσ2θe
−λτ
[1 + βe−λτ ]2
− C ′(τ).
We now observe that, since C ′(0) = 0, it follows that ∂E[pi
c(q|θ)]
∂τ
|τ=0 > 0, and that, since
C ′(·) > 0, it follows that ∂E[pic(q|θ)]
∂τ
|τ=∞ < 0. Moreover
∂2E [pic (q|θ)]
∂τ∂τ
= −
[
λ2βσ2θe
−λτ
[1 + βe−λτ ]3
[
1− βe−λτ]+ C ′′(τ)] .
Since C ′′(·) ≥ 0, C ′′′(·) ≥ 0 and 1 − βe−λτ is negative for small value of τ (recall that
β > βˆ = 1) and, as τ increases, 1 − βe−λτ becomes eventually positive, it follows that
∂2E[pic(q|θ)]
∂τ∂τ
is either negative for all τ > 0, or it is positive for small value of τ and negative
otherwise. Summarizing, we have shown that the function ∂E[pi
c(q|θ)]
∂τ
is (i) positive at τ = 0,
(ii) negative at τ = ∞ and (iii) it is either decreasing in τ or it is first increasing and then
decreasing in τ . As a consequence of (i)-(iii) we obtain that the optimal capacity τ c uniquely
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solves
∂E [pic (q|θ)]
∂τ
=
λβσ2θe
−λτc
[1 + βe−λτc ]2
− C ′(τ c) = 0.
Since ∂E[pi
c(q|θ)]
∂τ
is increasing in σ2θ and since, from above,
∂2E[pic(q|θ)]
∂τ∂τ
|τ=τc < 0, an application
of the implicit function theorem implies that τ c is an increasing function of σ2θ. From inves-
tigation of the optimality condition of τ c and the assumptions that C ′(0) = 0, it follows that
τ c → 0 as σ2θ → 0 and that τ c →∞ as σ2θ →∞.
We now consider the case in which the organization is balanced. The expected profits in
the balanced organization are
E
[
pid (q|θ)] = − 2βσ2θe−λτ2
1 + βe−
λτ
2
− C(τ).
Taking the derivative with respect to τ we obtain
∂E
[
pid (q|θ)]
∂τ
=
λβσ2θe
−λτ
2[
1 + βe−
λτ
2
]2 − C ′(τ).
We can now proceed in the same fashion as in the case for the balanced organization to
conclude that the optimal capacity τ d uniquely solves
∂E
[
pid (q|θ)]
∂τ
=
λβσ2θe
−λτd
2[
1 + βe−
λτd
2
]2 − C ′(τ d) = 0,
and that τ d is an increasing function of σ2θ, τ
d → 0 as σ2θ → 0 and τ d →∞ as σ2θ →∞.
Since the optimal capacity in the focused and balanced organization are both increasing
in σ2θ and since the optimal organization is either focused or balanced, it follows that the
optimal capacity of the optimal organization is increasing in σ2θ.
We now prove the second part of the proposition. First note that for a given common τ
∂E [pic (q, τ |θ)]
∂τ
− ∂E
[
pid (q, τ |θ)]
∂τ
> 0,
if, and only if,
e−λτ
[1 + βe−λτ ]2
− e
−λτ
2
[1 + βe−
λτ
2 ]2
> 0,
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and, after plain algebra, this condition is equivalent to
−
[
e−
λτ
2 − e−λτ
] [
1− β2e− 3λτ2
]
> 0 ⇐⇒ 1− β2e− 3λτ2 < 0.
Since τ c(σ2θ) is increasing in σ
2
θ ranging from 0 to ∞, there exists a unique σˆ2θ that solves
1−β2e− 3λτ
c(σˆ2θ)
2 = 0. By construction, if σ2θ = σˆ
2
θ, then τ
c(σˆ2θ) = τ
d(σˆ2θ). The next observation
is used in the rest of the proof.
Observation 1. τ d(σ2θ) < τ
c(σˆ2θ) if, and only if, σ
2
θ < σˆ
2
θ.
To see this note that since τ c is increasing in σ2θ, it follows that 1 − β2e−
3λτc(σˆ2θ)
2 < 0 for
all σ2θ < σˆ
2
θ. Hence,
∂E[pid(q|θ)]
∂τ
|τc(σ2θ) < 0, which implies that τ d(σ2θ) < τ c(σ2θ). Analogously,
since τ is increasing in σ2θ, it follows that 1 − β2e−3τc(σ2θ) > 0 for all σ2θ > σˆ2θ. Hence,
∂E[pid(q|θ)]
∂τ
|τc(σ2θ) > 0, which implies that τ d(σ2θ) > τ c(σ2θ).
Define now σ2θ as the solution to 1 − β2e−λτd(σ2θ) = 0 and define σ¯2θ be such that 1 −
β2e−λτ
c(σ¯2θ) = 0. We now show that σ2θ > σˆ
2
θ. By definition of σˆ
2
θ and σ
2
θ, we have that
1− β2e− 3λτ
d(σˆ2θ)
2 = 0 = 1− β2e−λτd(σ2θ),
which implies that τ d(σ2θ) > τ
d(σˆ2θ), and since τ
d is increasing in σ2θ it follows that σ
2
θ > σˆ
2
θ.
We next show that σ¯2θ > σ
2
θ. By definition of σ¯
2
θ and σ
2
θ we have that
1− β2e−λτd(σ2θ) = 0 = 1− β2e−λτc(σ¯2θ),
which implies that τ d(σ2θ) = τ
c(σ¯2θ). Since σ
2
θ > σˆ
2
θ and since τ
d(σ2θ) > τ
c(σ2θ) for all σ
2
θ > σˆ
2
θ,
we have that τ d(σ2θ) > τ
c(σ2θ). Hence, in order for τ
d(σ2θ) = τ
c(σ¯2θ) to hold we must have
that σ¯2θ > σ
2
θ.
We now complete the proof of the second part of Proposition 10. If σ2θ ≤ σ2θ, then
1−β2e−λτd(σ2θ) ≤ 0 and 1−β2e−λτc(σ2θ) < 0. We know that for all τ such that 1−β2e−λτ ≤ 0
the optimal organization is focused. Hence, if σ2θ ≤ σ2θ the optimal organization is focused.
Finally, if σ2θ ≥ σ¯2θ, then 1− β2e−λτc(σ2θ) ≥ 0 and 1− β2e−λτd(σ2θ) > 0 and therefore it follows
that the balanced organization is optimal. 
From the first part of the Proposition, it pays to invest more in communication capacity
when the environment becomes more volatile. Intuitively, the cost of not being adapted is
then larger and a better communication capacity allows for better adaptation. From Part 2,
a focused organization is optimal in environments for which adaptation is not very important.
Intuitively, a focused organizations is optimal when the communication capacity is limited,
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and the organization does not invest much in communication capacity when adaptation
is not very important. Similarly, balanced organizations are optimal when adaptation to
the environment is very important, and the organization invests heavily in communication
capacity.
4.8 Appendix H: Examples of organizational Change
Management scholars argue that improvements in communication technology, the increased
importance of adaptation to consumer needs as well as our better understanding of the
principles of management have led to a profound change in the organization of production.18
There is indeed clear and mounting evidence of organizational change19 but the causes behind
it remain murkier.20 In our framework several sources of exogenous variation can result
in different organizational forms, such as an increase in the importance of adaptation, as
measured by φi, or improvements in communication technology as proxied by either an
increase in λ or investments in τ , perhaps driven by a drop in the costs of IT (see Appendix
F in the new version of the paper.)
We next describe, briefly, three examples of organizational change and argue that our
model helps illuminate the drivers of these changes. The first case discusses organizational
changes at Procter & Gamble and, more broadly, global consumer packaged goods firms.
The second example studies changes in the apparel-retail industries, which were caused by
the interaction of an increased need for adaptation to fashion trends and improvements in
IT such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). The final example is concerned with a par-
ticularly successful innovation in management called Quality Function Deployment (QFD),
which is geared towards solving problems of coordination between different functions, such
as marketing and engineering, in, for instance, product development and design.
4.8.1 The organization of global consumer packaged good companies.
As our first example, we discuss changes in the organization of global consumer packed good
(CPG) companies in the last few decades.21 To make the link with our model concrete,
one can think of global CPG companies, such as Nestle, P&G or Unilever, as having two
18Consultants have also embraced the mantra of organizational change encouraging, for instance, the
adoption of flatter organizational forms as well as the blurring of traditional hierarchical relations. See, for
example, Boston Consulting Group (2006).
19In the literature in economics two classic references have become Rajan and Wulf (2010) and Caroli and
van Reenen (2011).
20There are though some notable exceptions. For instance, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) show the causal
effect of competition on delayering and broader task allocation.
21In this section we draw heavily on HBS case 9-707-519 “Proctor & Gamble Organization 2005”
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primary and equally important functions: sales and marketing/product development. The
sales organization develops the firm’s short-term sales strategy and is responsible for adapting
the firm’s product portfolio to trends in regional markets. The sales team relies on close
contacts with the distribution channel for decision-relevant information. The marketing and
product development team, in contrast, is responsible for the firm’s long-term marketing
strategy, and relies on focus groups and market tests to develop and launch new products.
In order to be effective, each functional team must be responsive to its task-specific local
information and undertake steps to coordinate short-term sales and long-term marketing
strategies. For the latter purpose, the head of the sales organization and the head of the
marketing organization hold regular conference calls, exchange emails, in addition to face-
to-face meetings. Thus, as in our model, both functions require the organization to be
responsive to (different) task-specific shocks and both tasks are highly interdependent.
Our model predicts that if organizational attention is scarce, it is optimal to prioritize
one of these two functions, even when both are equally important for competitive succes.
Thus, global consumer good companies should prioritize either global marketing and product
developement – and dedicate most of the inter-task communication to discuss and coordinate
new initiatives in product development or, alternatively, prioritize the regional sales organi-
zations, and spend most of the meetings and communication on how to customize products
to local tastes. Trying to excell at both functions, local customization and new product
development, is bound to produce an organization which is good at neither. Improvements
in communication technology, however, may change this and allow for dual objectives.
Consistent with this prediction, global CPG companies have in the past alternated be-
tween architectures that are organized along regional lines, and prioritize local customization,
and structures which are organized along product lines, and favor global product develop-
ment. For example, until recently, P&G used to be organized along regional lines, with
global marketing managers having limited power, and each region having its own market-
ing function directly reporting to regional management. By the late 1990’s, however, P&G
was lagging behind some of its competitors in product development and new product in-
troductions. In response to this, P&G launched a new organizational architecture, dubbed
“Organization 2005.” In the new organizational chart, Market Development Organizations
(MDO’s) responsible for sales and tailoring global strategies to local markets, and Product
Divisions, responsible for global marketing initiatives and new product development, would
“sit next to each other” in the organizational chart, with no hierarchical reporting rela-
tionship between them. According to P&G’s legendary CEO, A.G. Lafley, the MDO’s were
responsible for “the first moment of truth, where the customer sees the product in the store.”
The product divisions were responsible for “the second moment of truth, where the customer
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uses the product at home.” Rather than having one function reporting to the other, as in
the past, coordination in the new organization purely relied on horizontal communication.
In fact, “mutual interdependence” became the new moto at P&G, and employees were given
intensive training in interpersonal skills and building social networks. After some initial
adjustment, the structure met with substantial success, and several of its competitors, such
as Unilever, put similar structures into place. Beyond falling behind on competitors, what
prompted organizational change (and its widespread imitation) is unclear. A combination of
improvements in communication technology and an increase in the importance of adaptation
to consumer needs (arguably because of increased global competition) seem to be the most
likely drivers.
4.8.2 The apparel industry and lean retailing.
The drivers of organizational change are more transparent in our second example: the apparel
industry. Apparel is perhaps the quintessential example of a fashion good and apparel
retailers compete furiously to match current trends. Forecasting fashion trends though is
notoriously hard. As a result, many apparel retailers have recently adopted lean management
methods22 that allows them to avoid the “curse of forecasting” and instead adapt to current
trends through the rapid replenishment of inventories. There was a time though when
fashion, at least in some segments, was not as volatile and the need to adapt to fashion
trends less acute. Men’s fashion is a case in point.
The introduction of the sewing machine, the standardized body-size measurement system
and the need to produce military uniforms for the Civil War led to a remarkable revolution in
the production of men’s clothes. Whereas in 1880 less than half of the men’s suits were ready
made, by 1920 that had become the norm.23 Standardization of men’s clothes extended to
many other pieces of garments such as shirts, which, to use the Model T aphorism, men
could buy in any color as long as it was white. Indeed men’s white shirts accounted for
about 72% of the market in 1962. But the social changes of the postwar period led to a
new taste for fashion also amongst men. By 1972, a decade later, white shirts accounted
for only 19% of the sales and “fancy shirts,” anything that was not white, and sport shirts
came to dominate the market.24 The need to adapt to men’s new fashion consciousness put
22According to Abernathy et al. (1995) “[T]he term lean retailing ... refers to a cluster of inter-related
practices undertaken by retail channels to achieve the objective of matching consumer demand and retail
supply.
23See Abernathy et al. (1995, p. 180).
24See Pashigian (1988) for a wonderful study of these changes in men’s fashion. He attributes these changes
to “the dramatic transition toward more casual clothing where there is greater opportunity for individual
expression and creativity through product selections.”
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considerable pressure on traditional retailers, which in the case of maladaptation were forced
to offer considerable markdowns with the consequent loss in revenue.
Simultaneously, there were considerable advances during this period in communication
technology. Two were the innovations that greatly increased the ability to communicate
in the apparel business. First the introduction of the Uniform Product Code (UPC; the
barcode) in the mid 1970s and its widespread adoption25 in the 1980s allowed retailers to
keep track of the enormous growth of different products (or SKUs, Stock Keeping Units).26
Second the introduction of the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) made possible for apparel
manufacturers to receive information directly from the point of sales, which transmit in-
formation about what is selling or not. Whereas the adoption of UPC is an industrywide
phenomenon, EDI requires specific investments by firms to connect directly points of sales
to apparel manufacturers.27
Our model speaks to these issue as follows. Consider Figure 2. There we show the case
of the organization of apparel production, which is comprised of three agents: Headquarters
(HQ), where managerial and other decisions are taken, the Shop, in contact with customers,
and the Supplier in charge of producing the garments. Traditional retailers are structured
as in (a). In this case both the Shop and Supplier direct their attention to HQ, in charge
of establishing product design and quality standards to suppliers and supplying the shop
directly. Instead the lean retailing model is as in (b). There the company invests in EDI
(and the adoption of the UPC) and now HQ and the Shop both communicate with each
other and the supplier directs its attention to both.28
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that this is what happened with some of the
apparel retailers in the early 1970s. Many of the large department stores failed to meet
the increased need for adaptation (an increase in φ) which opened the door to new, more
specialized, retailers with new lean management techniques and thus more adaptive (such
as Esprit, founded in 1968 or The Gap, founded in 1969).
There is also more systematic evidence. Hwang and Weil (1998) look at a sample of 103
apparel business units between 1988 and 1992. Together they comprise 20% of all apparel
shipments in the US. They find that the business units that adopted the lean retailing
25Barcodes were extended to the products sold by the mass retailers such as Walmart between 1983 and
1987. See Abernathy et al. (2000).
26For instance an average food store has gone from offering about 6000 SKUs to customers in the 1960s,
to about 25,000 in the early 1990s, to almost 40,000 a decade later; see Abernathy et al. (2000).
27For a survey of the adoption of lean practices in the apparel business see Aberthany et al. (1995).
28There are also changes in the organization of production in the supplier as documented in the literature
on lean retailing. Suppliers supplying lean retailers abandon traditional production methods, the Progressive
Bundle System, in favor of methods of production that emphasize team work and job rotation; for these
implications the model of Dessein and Santos (2006) is more appropriate.
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Figure 2: EDI and retailing
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manufacturing practices and transitioned from Figure 2 (a) to (b) invested heavily in EDI.
The drop in information costs were of course industry wide. They show that what explains
the adoption of these practices was precisely the need for quick replenishment of inventories,
which they take as a proxy for the increased need to adapt to customer tastes.29 In sum,
the adoption of these more horizontal communication networks allows retailers to adjust
the supply of products offered to consumers to match actual levels of demand for different
products: “By using daily demand information arising from point-of-sale data collected at
the store-level to govern supply, modern retailers change the flow of information and goods
with apparel suppliers.” (see Hwang and Weil, 1998, p. 7).
4.8.3 An innovation in management: Quality Function Deployment
The adoption of lean manufacturing in the apparel business has the striking characteristic
that the short production cycle of garment allows for the direct connection between the cus-
tomer and the manufacturer. In other sectors such a direct connection between the customer
and the manufacturer is simply not feasible given the length of the production cycle. Here
different solutions have to be found to the problem of adaptation without direct customer
contact. One such famous solution is the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) framework,
which tries to integrate customer needs at all stages of the design and production processes.30
As explained by Hauser and Clausing (1988) “[a] set of planning and communication rou-
29The measure is constructed by the percentage of sales provided by apparel business units to the retailers
on a daily and weekly basis.
30The literature on QFD is simply staggering and the number of cases studied as well. Here we discuss
QFD in the context of design or product developments but there are indeed many other applications. For
an overwhelming survey of the literature see Chan and Wu (2002).
23
tines, quality function deployment focuses and coordinates skills within an organization, first
to design, then to manufacture and market goods that customers want to purchase and will
continue to purchase. The foundation of the house of quality31 is the belief that products
should be designed to reflect customers’ desires and tastes - so marketing people, design
engineers, and manufacturing staff must work closely together from the time a product is
first conceived.” This technique, pioneered in the early 70s in Japan,32 stands in contrast
to the traditional phase review process, where each stage in the design process is reviewed
by management before it proceeds to the next one. Instead under the QFD framework,
marketing, engineering and R & D are supposed to collaborate and communicate actively
to integrate customer needs from the start. In terms of our model, QFD can be seen as
an innovation in management which makes ex post coordination and communication more
effective. As such, it can be interpreted as an increase in λ.
Most relevant with respect to our model, QFD results in clear communication patterns
inside the organization that differ from the communications patterns of other organiza-
tional arrangements. Griffin and Hauser (1992) compare communication patterns in two
new-product teams working on parallel component projects in the automobile industry, one
working under QFD and the other subject to the phase review process described above.
They find that “QFD enhances communication levels within the core team (marketing, engi-
neering, manufacturing). QFD changes communication patterns from “up-over-down” flows
through management to more horizontal routes where core team members communicate
directly with one another.” Interestingly the QFD team communicates less with members
which are external to the core team (whereas in the phase review process everyone commu-
nicates through management in each of the stages, including those parties outside the team).
Thus, consistent with the model, the adoption of QFD led to a starch dichotomy between
two types of tasks: Internal ones engaged in active communication and external ones with
limited input into the core activities.
Finally, a hallmark of the house of quality, the main tool to implement QFD, is the
identification and prioritization of engineering and production targets in order to adapt to
particular customer demands. Indeed, the house of quality features a double entry chart in
31The house of quality is a particular technique for the implementation of QFD. See Hauser and Clausing
(1988) for an example of a house of quality applied to the design of car doors.
32According to Chan and Wu (2002), the first application of QFD techniques was in the Kobe Dockyard
of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 1971, followed shortly afterwards by its adoption by Toyota, first Toyota’s
Hino Motor in 1975, then in Toyota Autobody in 1977 with impressive results, and finally into the whole
Toyota group. In the US, and always according to Chan and Wu (2002), the first recorded case study
in QFD was probably in 1986 when Kelsey Hayes used QFD to develop a coolant sensor, “which fulfilled
critical customer needs such as “easy-to-add coolant,” “easy-to-identify unit,” and “provide cap removal
instructions,” ” Other early adopters included 3M, AT&T, Ford, ...
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which customer attributes are matched to engineering targets and are marked to reflect their
relative importance, which seems to correspond well with the version of the model where
adaptation to particular tasks differ in their importance.33
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